Expanding the Scope of Intuitions by Bob Overing
Expanding the Scope of Intuitions
LD debaters are relying more and more on intuitions as data for framework arguments. Here are a few examples I’ve seen in the past two years:
- Racism as absolutely unjustifiable regardless of moral framework
- Reflective equilibrium as a moral method
- Counter-examples as responses to frameworks
A number of debate theorists, many trained in moral philosophy, have espoused a model where framework debates involve greater reliance on intuitions. Take two different responses to utilitarianism. On their view, answers such as the paraphrasing of Taurek’s argument, “two headaches don’t make a migraine, so aggregation is nonsensical,” should lose ground to answers with more intuitive strength such as “utilitarianism would allow slavery if it happened to promote the greatest good.” The former has long been common in circuit LD while the latter has not, but a shift is occurring nonetheless.
My central question: Would these same theorists defend the use of intuitions for evaluating other parts of the debate? Specifically, should judges use intuitions to evaluate theory and topicality?
First, let’s consider when judges should not employ intuitions. The Jan/Feb 2015 topic has produced plenty of debates where intuitions would be inappropriate. A judge shouldn’t decide if the living wage produces an employment effect, for instance, through intuitions; there should be a debate about the merits of the economic research. Few economists would accept answers on the basis of intuitions alone, yet many moral philosophers seem married to the idea of intuitions as an integral part of their method.
So is theory more like an empirical science or moral philosophy? Questions like “Does topicality deter non-topical affs?” and “How much literature is accessible under my definition?” are purely descriptive. However, “Should we accept NIBs bad as a general rule?” or “Should we promote fairness in debate?” are distinctly ethical. No, theory isn’t Kant vs. consequentialism, but it seems that some theory debates are ripe for the same kind of intuition-pumping that’s happening on the framework level. Ryan Davis and Ben Koh come to mind as two who have independently defended the thesis that theory voters should be subject to more robust ethical criticism. If they’re right, we should port all the methods of framework debate too.
I realize the suggestion might be scary. No one wants the judge who just “gut-checks” in the back of the room. What if your opponent reads ten conditional counterplans? What if everything goes wrong and theory is your only out? You want the debate to be in your control, and intuitions seem to move away from that.
Yet many judges are already using intuitions to make sense of “muddled” theory debates, so why not make the practice known so debaters can anticipate it? Replace the image of the LD judge from “before theory was a thing” who votes seemingly at random with a more sophisticated image of a judge weighing principles and intuitions just as in a framework debate. What previously unpersuasive arguments gain weight? What previously successful arguments lose ground? Here are some quick ideas:
- “Fairness not an impact” and “education not an impact” become unviable.
- Weighing between standards becomes more modest such that if ground outweighs predictability, predictability is still relevant. Same goes for weighing between voters.
- Reasonability is more persuasive.
- The strength of utterly false theory arguments is diminished.
- The strength of utterly false theory arguments is diminished (for emphasis).
The last reason is a pretty good one. Even if you like theory debate, you can appreciate the increase in quality that could come from greater use of intuitions.
Weigh in on how you think intuitions could be used in non-framework portions of the debate. I’m also interested in hearing more creative ideas for reducing the prevalence of theory in LD – for related discussions, see my post on theory spikes and John’s post on the RVI.
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Bob co-directs Premier Debate, coaches his alma mater Loyola High School and debates on the NDT/CEDA circuit for the USC Trojan Debate Squad. His students earned 32 TOC bids in his first two years coaching. As a senior at Loyola, Bob earned 11 bids and was a TOC finalist.
2 Comments
Interesting article, and I really like the logic behind it. I’m probably against appealing to intuitions is probably bad in debate settings anyway, though I could be persuaded by no FW can endorse racism/etc.
I was actually just thinking about this sort of thing today, and I think issues like theory have already more intuition. If I read a shell, and my opponent makes a “you violate” a lot of judges will accept that as a reason to drop me, not just the shell, because somehow my intent or hypocrisy is an aggravating factor. I see theory more as a reason to vote to rectify some state of affairs and not as punishment, necessarily, so intent doesn’t really seem like it should be a factor (like violations describe what your practice was, not what you intended). Nonetheless, it still seems a lot of judges hold that opinion that it does.
I’m not sure the example you cite is where judges are using intuitions. The reason you’d lose on “you violate” is because it’s a link turn (if theory is the only procedural in the debate and competing interpretations is accepted, no judge would drop “just the shell”). Now if judges are making unstated weighing arguments for the new violation over the initial one, that’s a problem of intervention. They could intervene using intuitions or some other source of evidence, but either way it’s bad.
But here’s another way to look at it: at a certain point, an argument becomes so well-worn in a technical sphere of communication like our own that it can become tacitly accepted, an enthymeme. I.e., before, the argument needed to have X-Y-Z to be viable, but now it only needs X-Y. In your example, Z would be the punishment/intent-based weighing argument.