Substantive/Structural Fairness by Bob Overing and John Scoggin
Today we aim to add some clarity to an increasingly argued issue in LD theory debates: the substantive/structural fairness divide.
Theory introduces a new method of evaluation for the judge. Instead of evaluating the merits of the aff and neg cases, the judge is to determine the theory debate based on which interpretation is most fair and educational. To do this, we must have some definition of fairness.
A commonly-accepted understanding of fairness in debate is something like
Fairness 1: A debate is fair when the judge impartially determines who the better debater is in a given round.
Contrast this with another definition:
Fairness 2: A debate is fair when both debaters have an equal chance of winning a given round.
Fairness 2 is obviously wrong. First, it would imply that an adjudication method like flipping a coin is fair because both debaters have an equal chance of success. The first definition would exclude coin-flipping because it would not result in a determination of skill nor would it be impartial: it would disadvantage the more skilled debater relative to other models. Second, Fairness 2 would never be satisfied in a normal debate. Any skill discrepancy (being a better researcher, writer, or arguer) would mean that one debater has a greater chance of success. Thus, our definition of fairness must be concerned with impartial adjudication and not producing equal outcomes.
What kinds of practices compromise the judge’s ability to impartially determine the better debater? The term “structural abuse” is used to describe practices that would violate Fairness 1 and “substantive abuse” to describe practices that would violate Fairness 2 but not Fairness 1. Let’s give some examples.
Negative NIB: The neg debater is of inferior skill but reads a necessary/insufficient burden, an argument about epistemic skepticism, and then turns the aff case. Now, the neg has two ways to win while the aff only has one.
In Negative NIB, Fairness 1 is compromised because the judge cannot impartially determine the better debater given that the neg was at an arbitrary advantage.
Better Evidence: The neg debater is of superior skill because she reads a solvency turn backed by better evidence than the solvency of the aff.
In Better Evidence, Fairness 2 is compromised because the neg has a better chance of winning, but Fairness 1 is not compromised because the judge can still make an impartial decision about who is more skilled. The difference between the two cases is that in Negative NIB, the advantage gained cannot be traced to superior skill, but in Better Evidence, we can say the neg is more skilled in the area of research. In Negative NIB, the aff might win the debate, but nothing could allow the judge to make a completely impartial evaluation of skill. Consider a basketball game where team A was allowed a three-point shot and team B was not. It would be difficult to determine which team is truly better. Some amount of skill might allow team B to win, but we still would not call that arrangement fair.
Allowing abuse claims based on Fairness 2 creates a contradiction. Say in Better Evidence that the aff debater advances a theory argument that says “I do not have an equal chance to win the round because the neg has better evidence, so the round is unfair. Cast your ballot that I am the better debater.” Because this substantive abuse claim isolates a skill discrepancy, the theory argument really says “I am the worse debater because the neg has better evidence. Cast your ballot that I am the better debater.”
We should reject any definition of fairness that allows “I am the worse debater; vote for me” to be a valid theory argument.
John and Bob are co-directors of Premier Debate. During the last 5 years John’s students have earned 66 bids to the tournament of champions. John has coached 2 TOC finalists, a TOC quarterfinalist, and champions of many major national tournaments across the country. Bob has coached students to 32 bids in 2 years. In high school, he earned 13 TOC bids and was 2nd at the TOC. He currently debates for the USC Trojan Debate Squad.
4 Comments
What are some common theory shells that you would say are substantive abuse?
Would a shell saying “neg can’t run x-framework on y-topic” with the standards being about how the lit is overwhelmingly neg biased on the topic by structural or substantive?
I think that framework can potentially be structurally unfair. The main reason is that if we take a morally confident stance (premierdebatetoday.com/2014/08/31/moral-modesty-part-1-by-bob-overing-and-adam-bistagne/), framework is absolutely exclusive of the opponent’s offense, which may then artificially give one side a lighter burden. If frameworks are not exclusive in this way, then picking a framework that favors one side is indistinguishable from a skill that we ought to promote, namely, good moral weighing. Just like the Better Evidence case, the debater who picks a good framework has an advantage resulting from superior skill.
Any theory shell could fail to meet the standard for identifying structural abuse. For example, a plans bad shell that only makes a research burdens argument (say without an impact to ground) is probably only making a claim to Fairness 2 because research skills are something that should be tested. Research skill should affect the chance that each side wins the round, but we do not think they compromise the judge’s ability to fairly judge skill because research skill is a skill!
Hopefully, I’ve provided a template for how to apply the distinction in practice. I generally think weak predictability and research arguments are most likely to be substantive abuse claims. Another good rule of thumb is to ask if a theory argument is really just saying “hard to answer.” If the argument indicted doesn’t alter ground or burdens in any real way, it might not be unfair; it might just be a good argument!
1. Say the affirmative debater is a lone wolf, and the negative debater has an experienced coach who does all their research for them. The lone wolf is a much better debater, but has fewer resources and no access to common arguments read on the circuit. The 1NC is a case written by the coach, and the 2NR are blocks written by the coach. If the neg is winning on the flow does voting for him/her still constitute voting for the “better debater”.
2. What if the judge knows one debater is better than the other, but somehow the worse debater is winning on the flow. For example, I am debating Akhil Jalan and his timer stops working or he drops his flow and misses some crucial argument. If the judge is trying to vote for the better debater, why shouldn’t he vote for Akhil? (This is purely for the sake of discussion. If Akhil drops his timer please pick me up.)
The first scenario is an unfortunate reality of debate; after all, this is why some have said “debate is a game of kings.” Resource and coaching disparities are vast and can have a major impact on a debate round, yet they’re not attributable to any skill of the debaters. That said, their impact is also indistinguishable from superior skill. How is a judge to tell if a debater cut a card or his/her coach did it? What about trickier cases, like the debater who had the luck of attending a school with coaches who taught excellent refutation skills? This might seem unfair, but it’s not the kind of unfairness judges should be concerned about when evaluating a debate. Fairness 1 guarantees impartial evaluation “in a given round.” Resource disparities may unfairly affect the skill displayed, but that doesn’t impede a judge’s ability to evaluate those skills once they’re played out in a debate.
The same clause “in a given round” applies to your second question too. The judge needs to make an evaluation of the skill displayed, not some larger statement about the better debater.